A proper foreign policy for the US would
be consistent with and recognize the limitations placed upon our country by the
physical world in which we live.
First of all it would recognize that all
countries, including the US, have limited resources. These resources are
provided by the private economy; there is no other. All government spending,
for whatever reason and however justified, weakens the private economy. Most
importantly, the US must reject the myth of "war prosperity".
Military spending detracts from an economy's productive capacity. It uses
precious capital to produce non-consumable goods and robs the economy of some
of its most productive citizens. A nation's leaders must recognize that frugality
in a nation's military spending is as important for the nation's long term
welfare as is frugality in one's personal household spending.
Secondly, a sane foreign policy would
distinguish between what is in one's true national interest and what is not. It
would not embark on military adventures or commit the nation to future military
action when national security is not threatened. Furthermore, a sane foreign
policy would recognize that it is impossible for the US to judge disputes in
foreign lands, as if it were an impartial jury deciding the guilt and innocence
of the parties involved.
For the above reasons, the US would not
intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, for it would not be able to
understand the animosities which led to the conflict. Nor would it commit itself
to an open-ended collective security treaty. Not only would such a treaty
oblige the US to intervene militarily in long-standing foreign disputes, it
would encourage new disputes to the degree that members of the alliance would
feel less need to engage in difficult negotiations to find peaceful solutions
to the inevitable frictions which arise among nations. Furthermore, collective
security agreements suffer from moral hazard and the socialist tendency to consume the
resources provided by others.
A proper
foreign policy for the US is that of "Splendid Isolation", a term that came to be synonymous with
Britain's late nineteenth century policy of eschewing both formal alliances
with foreign nations and intervention in foreign affairs. Britain's foreign
secretary Edward Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby, articulated the policy succinctly
in 1866:
"It is the duty of
the Government of this country, placed as it is with regard to geographical
position, to keep itself upon terms of goodwill with all surrounding nations,
but not to entangle itself with any single of monopolising alliance with an one
of them, above all to endeavor not to interfere needlessly and vexatiously with
the internal affairs of an foreign country."
Notice that
the principle has two parts, both of which are necessary for either to become
realized in practice--no formal alliances with a foreign power and
non-intervention in the internal affairs of foreign nations. One is impossible
to achieve without the other.
Alliances oblige
members to intervene in matters that would not otherwise be viewed as necessary
to the security of the nation, and interventions in the internal affairs of
others almost always require at least the tacit cooperation of allies. An
example of the former is the US's intervention in Vietnam. It was triggered by
its membership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The US waged
war in Vietnam for over a decade before abandoning the fight. Today the US and
the communist regime there are on friendly terms, an astonishing development on
which few supposed foreign affairs experts have commented. Were the deaths and
disabilities on both sides and the expenditure of so much treasure even
necessary, since the two nations exist harmoniously now? What are Gold Star Mothers to think?
An example
of the second principle--that interventions require at least the tacit approval
of allies--is the ultimate failure of the Anglo-French invasion of Suez in
1956. The US was not informed of the invasion and was placed in a difficult
position when Russia threatened to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians. The US
was forced to confront Russia, but it also demanded that the British and the
French withdraw.
Some may
consider the lack of formal alliances and nonintervention in the affairs of
others to be a bad thing. If so, let them consider the relevant paragraph of
George Washington's famous 1796 Farewell Address:
36 The great rule of conduct for
us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to
have with them as little political connexion as possible. So far as we have
already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here
let us stop.
George Washington did not advise that the US never intervene in foreign affairs or that it never join an alliance. Later in his address he advised that the US conduct its foreign policy on an ad hoc basis "as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel" and that "we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies." Temporary alliances and interventions that serve our interest would require exceptional circumstances, a policy which is very similar to Edward Stanley's dual dictum to eschew formal alliances and interfering in the internal affairs of others.
NATO is an example of an alliance that was formed to meet an exceptional circumstance. All Europe had been weakened by war, and an aggressive Soviet Union maintained a large military presence in the Eastern European countries that it liberated from Nazi rule. The Mitrokhin Archives reveal without a doubt that it had designs on the rest of Europe as well. America's solemn treaty to defend Western Europe as if it were American soil created a stalemate and deterred Soviet designs until its economy collapsed and new leadership pulled its troops out of Eastern Europe. At this point NATO could and should have been disbanded. Western Europe's economies had fully recovered. Two NATO nations outside the US, France and Britain, had nuclear weapons. Germany's economy alone was greater than that of Russia, although it did not possess nuclear weapons.
The fallacy of the necessity of political control of
natural resources
America's current overseas bases and
deployments are based to a large part on the great fallacy--one which has led
to great conflicts--that a nation's prosperity depends upon the political
control of essential resources. This fallacy drove Nazi Germany, Shinto Japan,
and the USSR to imperial overreach and eventual downfall. None of these empires
realized anywhere near the pre-occupation production from their conquered lands,
which probably were net liabilities from the need of onerous oversight and
military protection. Just ask yourself whether it is better simply to buy
Middle Eastern oil or to conquer the entire Middle East and attempt to operate
the oil industry in what surely would be hostile territory. There is no reason
for alarm that control of Middle Eastern oil or any other vital resource would
allow America's enemies to deprive it of essential resources. Whoever controls
Middle Eastern oil, even ISIS, will sell it on the world market. Furthermore, the
current oil glut is amply evidence that the so-called energy shortage was the
result of decades of American price regulation and other governmental restrictions
on American energy production. An oil boycott today would bankrupt even Saudi
Arabia, who would lose customers to more reliable suppliers. For the same
reason Western Europe need not fear undue influence from Russia as a provider
of natural gas. Whatever temporary dependency that arises will be the outcome
of foolish policies from Europe itself. Germany, especially, is making its
economy dependent upon Russian energy supplies by practically outlawing coal
and nuclear power production and relying upon wind and solar to take up the
slack. The Poles know that this is a foolish policy. They are rebelling against
European Union restrictions on electricity production from fossil fuels, of
which Poland has ample supply.
The power of the consumer
Those who have personal concerns about
foreign production methods or the intent of foreigners to use their export
revenue to fund hostile groups may use the time-honored tactic of the consumer economic
boycott. Examples include the "Boycott Grapes"
movement, the demise of Venezuelan controlled Cities
Services/Citgo retail gasoline chain
following Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's criticism of America, and the fair
trade coffee movement to raise grower incomes. (Citing these examples of the
economic pressure that consumer wield is no endorsement that the movements were
either just or based upon sound economics, only that consumer pressure can and
does work in certain circumstances. Remember, Mises always cautioned that the
consumer was king in that his preferences established the structure of the
economy.)
In
conclusion, pertaining to our overarching relations with others, we would do
well to follow Barron's dictum: “Mind your own business and set a good
example.”
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